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This paper shows how political parties differentiate to reduce electoral competi-
tion. Two parties choose platforms in a unidimensional policy space, and then
candidates from these parties compete for votes in a continuum of constituen-
cies with different median voters. Departing from their parties’ platforms is costly
enough that candidates do not take the median voter’s preferred position in ev-
ery constituency. Because the candidate whose party is located closer to the me-
dian voter gets a higher expected payoff, parties acting in their candidates’ best
interests differentiate—when one party locates right of center, the other prefers
to locate strictly left of center to carve out a “home turf,” constituencies that
can be won with little to no deviation from the platform of the candidate’s party.
Hence, competition that pulls candidates together pushes parties apart. Decreas-
ing “campaign costs” increases party differentiation as the leftist party must move
further from the rightist party to carve out its home turf, as does increasing het-
erogeneity across constituencies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Competition among political parties is surprisingly lackluster. A signiﬁcant fraction of
seats in the American House of Representatives go uncontested by one of the two major
parties—Democrats or Republicans—each electoral cycle (seven percent of the seats in
the 2006 elections). Moreover, elections that are contested by both major parties tend
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This paper shows how political competition drives parties apart. Perhaps the most
famous result in formal political theory is that two candidates competing in a single
ﬁrst-past-the-post election for political ofﬁce should jointly adopt the median voter’s
preferred position (Hotelling 1929, Downs 1957, Black 1958). We use the Hotelling–
Downs model of electoral competition as a point of departure to explore party posi-
tioning. What types of platforms do political parties acting in their candidates’ best in-
terests espouse? We show that parties separate precisely because when party platforms
are identical candidates compete so vigorously. They differentiate to reduce political
competition.
We model a political party as a collection of candidates, each campaigning in a dif-
ferent constituency. In each constituency, candidates from two parties compete in a
ﬁrst-past-the-post election. Voters in every constituency have single-peaked prefer-
ences over the same unidimensional policy space; different constituencies have me-
dian voters with different ideal points. Voters in each constituency care only about their
elected candidate’s position and not the platform of that candidate’s party. Knowing the
distribution of the median voters’ ideal points, the two political parties choose where to
place their platforms in policy space. A party’s platform serves as its candidates’ default
policy position. In any constituency, either candidate may depart from her party’s posi-
tion,butatacost: thefurtherherpositionfromherpartyplatform,thehigherthecandi-
date’s cost. The most natural interpretation of these costs is campaign costs—informing
voters of a position different from the party’s requires costly advertising. (For exposi-
tional simplicity, we refer to these costs of departing from party platform as campaign
costs throughout.) Candidates trade campaign costs off against the private beneﬁt of
winning elections.
In this setting, we ask where political parties seeking to maximize their candidates’
payoffs choose to locate their platforms. Our main result is that if campaign costs are
high enough that candidates do not adopt the median voter’s preferred position in each
constituency, then parties do not jointly adopt the median among the median voters’
preferred positions; they differentiate from each other. This happens because the closer
the two parties locate to each other, the more vigorously their candidates compete to
win election in any given constituency. Consequently, each has an incentive to move
away from the other—giving up heavily contested elections—in order to carve out po-
litically sympathetic constituencies where it wins elections without much costly reposi-
tioning. While competition may drive candidates together, it drives parties apart.
Political parties provide their candidates with funds and organizational infrastruc-
ture as well as signaling their candidates’ policy positions. Candidates deviate from
party policy to cater to their constituents—Republicans in Maryland espouse more lib-
eral positions than their colleagues in Virginia—yet clearly do not go so far as to adopt
the median voter’s preferred position. Parties systematically lose elections in politically
unfavorable constituencies. Ansolabehere et al. (2001) present evidence that Repub-
lican House candidates in 1996 were without exception more conservative than their
Democratic challengers and lost in more liberal constituencies. In particular, candi-
dates do not espouse the preferred position of their median constituent. We model thisTheoretical Economics 2 (2007) Party platforms in electoral competition 43
party effect in a simple way: candidates pay campaign costs to deviate from their party
platform.
Candidates’ costs of deviating from party policy play a crucial role in our analysis.
We regard these costs as a reduced form of the many reasons why candidates may wish
to mimic their parties. Most literally, advertising or publicizing a new policy may be
costly (buying television spots, etc.), and the further is a candidate’s position from her
party’s, the more expensive it might be to convince voters of the candidate’s actual po-
sition. These costs also could represent unpalatable payments or promises to special
interests necessary to ﬁnance the publicizing of a departure from party policy. Political
action committees—pressure groups—provide forty percent of funding for U.S. Con-
gressional elections (Herrnson 1997). Because the formal model does not depend on
whether parties or candidates pay these costs, an alternative interpretation is that can-
didates have policy preferences and parties ﬁnd it harder to enlist candidates with pref-
erences further from their platforms. For the results, what matters most is that the over-
all game not be zero sum: given the number of elections they win, parties prefer that
their candidates adhere to the party platform.
Strictly speaking, in our model candidates prefer not to belong to either party, so
as to be able to adopt any position without cost. But for any number of reasons out-
side our formal model, candidates beneﬁt from party membership. Parties may reduce
the costs of elections by sharing ﬁxed costs across candidates. They may also enjoy le-
gal privileges beneﬁting their candidates: party candidates automatically appear on the
ballot in many elections, whereas unattached candidates must submit petitions signed
by enough voters. Likewise, we ignore candidates’ party assignments. In our model,
bothcandidatesprefertobelongtothepartyclosertotheirconstituency’smedianvoter.
Moreover,thecandidatebelongingtothepartyfurtherawayreceiveszeroexpectedpay-
off. Yet if candidates enjoy other beneﬁts from campaigning, and there are enough po-
tential candidates, neither party will have trouble ﬁelding a candidate. We believe that
wesacriﬁcelittleinrealismorapplicabilitybyassumingthatforexogenousreasonseach
constituency has an election comprising one candidate from each of two parties.
Finally, our assumption that parties seek to maximize the sum of their candidates’
payoffs means that they trade off the total number of seats they win against the cost
of winning them. In particular, parties care about more than winning a majority. After
seeing its Parliamentary majority slump from 165 in 2001 to 66 in the 2005 election,
the Labour party recently lost its ﬁrst vote under Tony Blair. The U.S. Republican party
uses a strategy of “catch and release”; ﬁrst, it whips (“catches”) party members so as to
guaranteeamajorityoncontroversiallegislation;second,it“releases”membersrunning
in elections predicted to be close to vote against the party (Hacker and Pierson 2005).
Both demonstrate the value of super-majorities. Likewise, parties beneﬁt from having
larger submajorities. For example, a submajority of 41 in the 100-member U.S. Senate
can prevent the majority from closing debate. Naturally some seats have more value
than others, e.g. the 51st in the U.S. Senate; for analytical tractability, we abstract from
this issue by assuming that all seats are equally valuable. Since parties also like money
(which, among other things, helps them to win future elections), they trade winning
seats against the cost of winning them.44 Eyster and Kittsteiner Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Section 2 presents our model. In Section 3, we analyze candidate competition in a
given constituency, taking party platforms as given. In our model, in any constituency,
thecandidatewhosepartyplatformliesclosertothemedianvoterhasanadvantageand
is more likely to win. In some constituencies, both candidates toe the party line, and
the advantaged candidate wins the election with probability one. In others, candidates
mixoverpolicypositions. Intheseconstituencies, theadvantagedcandidatesometimes
loses but always wins with higher likelihood than the disadvantaged candidate. Impor-
tantly, when a candidate’s advantage increases—her party is located closer to her con-
stituency’s median voter—her expected payoff increases: she can win the election with
any given probability at lower cost. This effect provides parties with an incentive to
move away from the center.
Section 4 analyzes parties that simultaneously choose platforms in the best inter-
ests of their members. When moving away from the center (the median among median
voters) parties trade off the expected number of seats their candidates win against the
campaign costs their candidates pay. Moving right causes the rightist party to lose elec-
tions in the center but allows it to carve out a home turf on the right, where elections
can be won at little or no cost. Because constituencies with centrist median voters are
heavily contested, they can be won only at considerable cost.1 Each party’s incentive to
winanyparticularconstituencydependsnotuponthevalueofelectionalonebutrather
upon its value net of campaign costs.
When campaign costs are high—candidates only reluctantly deviate from their par-
ties’ platforms—parties position themselves near the center of the policy spectrum but
sufﬁciently far apart that candidates from the leftist party do not contest constituencies
whosemedianvoterlies tothe rightof therightist party, and viceversa. Candidatesonly
ever depart from their parties’ positions to locate at the center. Consequently, the leftist
party’spositionlies(weakly)totheleftofallleftistcandidates’positions,andlikewisefor
therightistparty. Withhighcampaigncosts, eachpartyadoptsaplatformmoreextreme
than its most extreme candidate.
For lower campaign costs, parties locate further apart. Knowing that candidates
fromtheotherpartywillcompetemoreintenselyineveryconstituency,eachpartymust
separate more from the other in order to carve out its home turf. But once costs become
low enough that candidates adopt the median voter’s position in every constituency,
party platforms go back to the median among median voters, which minimizes candi-
dates’ campaign costs.
Section 5 discusses how our results are robust to changes in our assumption about
the distribution of voter preferences across constituencies. Section 6 concludes.
Literature
Severalauthorsexplorethe roleof partiesinelectoralcompetition. Austen-Smith (1984)
develops a model where in each of many constituencies two parties ﬁeld candidates in
1Indeed, Ansolabehere et al. (2001) ﬁnd the gap in candidates’ policy positions is smallest in Congres-
sional districts whose voters split ﬁfty-ﬁfty in the vote for President. This corresponds to an equilibrium in
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ﬁrst-past-the-post elections. Voters recognize that government policy depends upon
which party wins and the location of its candidates. Candidates seek to maximize vote
shares. Austen-Smith shows that in a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the game,
candidates position to set their party’s policy at the median voter’s bliss point. A cru-
cial difference between his paper and ours is that his voters care about the location
of the national party—turning party competition into Downsian competition—whereas
ours care about the location of the local candidate. In that sense, his model may better
resemble the British system of parliamentary democracy, where MPs have only loose
ties to their constituencies, and ours the U.S. congressional system, where congress
members have much stronger ties to their constituencies. Yet we suspect that voters
in both systems pay careful attention to their local candidates’ positions.2 Certainly our
model better reﬂects U.S. gubernatorial elections, where voters care only about their
own governors.
Snyder (1994) also models two parties competing across a ﬁnite number of het-
erogeneous constituencies. Party incumbents in the different constituencies set party
platformthroughmajoritarianvoting; theyhavelexicographicpreferencesoverwinning
and the number of seats won by their party. In each constituency voters elect the politi-
cian whose party locates closer to its median bliss point and in the event of a tie ran-
domize with equal probability. Snyder shows that in equilibrium parties differentiate,
dividing the political spectrum into left and right, where leftist candidates win in leftist
constituencies and only in such constituencies. One way that our model differs from
Snyder’s is in the size of differentiation: in his model, ordering constituencies from left
to right by their median bliss points, both parties locate between the medians in some
constituencies n and n +1. Another difference is the number of equilibria, as the cutoff
n in his model is arbitrary. At a more conceptual level, Snyder’s differentiation hinges
on a conﬂict of interest within the party; non-incumbents would like to compensate the
incumbents to move the party platform to the center, but cannot. By contrast, in our
model the party maximizes the total payoff of its candidates.
Levy (2004) models parties in the citizen-candidate model of Osborne and Slivin-
ski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) as being able to credibly commit to positions,
whereas candidates cannot do so individually. In her model, parties are effective only
in a multidimensional policy space, as they work by allowing groups to exploit gains
from trade from different preferences across issues. Rather than view parties as al-
liances among autonomous candidates, we model them as the primary drivers of po-
litical competition.
Snyder and Ting (2002) model parties as brand names. Voters have no information
about candidates’ positions other than their party membership (or lack thereof) and
have preferences that depend upon the mean and variance of their beliefs about the
candidates’ locations. They like candidates whose positions they expect to be near their
2A growing psychology and economics literature describes how people use “narrow brackets,” focusing
on each decision in isolation without considering its global implications (see, inter alia, Kahneman and
Tversky 1979, and Read et al. 1999). Voters using such “narrow brackets” pay more attention to their local
candidate’s position than fully rational voters and may be more likely to fall prey to the “catch and release”
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own but dislike variance in their beliefs. Snyder and Ting show that when parties can
reduce the variance of their members’ positions by choosing extreme positions, then in
equilibrium parties may prefer to locate at the extremes.3
AnumberofauthorshavemodiﬁedtheHotelling–Downsmodelofelectoralcompe-
titioninwaysthatproducedifferentiatedcandidates. Wittman(1983)andCalvert(1985)
show that candidates may not converge when they care both about winning the elec-
tion and about the position of the winner. Banks (1990) models competition between
two candidates who ﬁnd departing from their ideal positions costly. He characterizes a
semi-separating equilibrium where candidates with ideal points near the median voter
adopt the median position, while those with more extreme positions separate. Hence
centrist candidates pay costs to depart from their ideal points; in our model, candi-
dates who likewise pay costs to differentiate from their parties do not always adopt the
median voter’s position. Palfrey (1984) demonstrates that when two established candi-
dates choose positions before a third candidate enters the race, the established candi-
dates differentiate to eliminate proﬁtable entry opportunities. Callander (2005) extends
Palfrey’s framework to model parties competing across heterogeneous constituencies,
where established national parties choose positions before local candidates compete
in each constituency. Callander ﬁnds equilibria where parties differentiate even when
challengers may choose not to enter, unlike in Palfrey’s model.4 Chan (2001), Heidhues
andLagerlöf(2003), andBernhardtetal.(2007)constructmodelswherecandidatessep-
arate due to asymmetric information about voters’ preferences. Bernhardt and Ingber-
man (1985) model an incumbent with a reputation facing a challenger who cannot re-
veal his position with certainty. When voters dislike risk, the incumbent need not move
to the median voter to defeat the challenger; hence, candidates differentiate. With the
exception of Palfrey (1984) and Callander (2005), all of these models bear more resem-
blance to our model of candidate competition than our model of party competition. In
our model, candidates differentiate because they start from different party platforms,
which produces an effect similar to the asymmetric information or heterogeneous pref-
erences in these other papers. (Our candidates differentiate by using different (possibly
mixed)strategies. Inthecontextofpricecompetition,Besteretal.(1996)havenotedthat
common mixed strategies produce ex post differentiation.) By contrast, in our model
parties differentiate despite symmetric starting points.
The intuition underlying our main result more closely resembles a literature in in-
dustrial organization on price competition between duopolists. Hotelling (1929) an-
alyzes a model of two ﬁrms’ choosing spatial locations knowing that consumers face
transport costs. When prices are ﬁxed, he shows that ﬁrms locate at the same position.
D’Aspremont et al. (1979) show that when spatial location precedes price competition,
and transport costs are quadratic, ﬁrms exhibit maximal differentiation. While ﬁrms
3Of course, if moving away from the center increased variance—if extremist parties were more hetero-
geneous rather than more homogeneous as in Snyder and Ting (2002)—then parties in equilibrium would
locate at the center.
4InCallander’smodel,partiesmayseparatebymorethanthedistancebetweenmedianvotersintheleft-
mostandright-mostconstituencies, somethingtheyneverdoinourmodel(evenifwerelaxanassumption
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wish to move together for given prices, they wish to separate to gain market power in
order to put up prices; this latter effect dominates. Costly relocation in our model plays
a role similar to price competition in their model. Konrad (2000) makes a related point
in a model where ﬁrms choose locations before competing in an all-pay auction for the
right to sell a good to a customer whose location is initially unknown; the winning ﬁrm
pays the cost of transportation to the consumer. Such all-pay auctions with heteroge-
neous, public valuations have been analyzed by Baye et al. (1996). Konrad (2000) shows
that ﬁrms differentiate so as to minimize industry transport costs. One key difference
from our paper is that in political competition, no candidate moves further than the
median voter. This resembles a bid cap in an all-pay auction, which generates equilibria
in the second stage of our game qualitatively different from those of Baye et al. (1996).
2. THE MODEL
Two parties A and B compete in elections across a continuum of heterogeneous con-
stituencies. Each constituency is identiﬁed by its median voter’s bliss point δ—which
we assume to be unique—and we assume that the distribution of δ across constituen-
cies is uniform on [0,1].5 The election game comprises two stages. In the ﬁrst stage
(Stage 1), the parties simultaneously choose platforms in the policy space [0,1]. After
Stage 1, but before Stage 2, everyone observes the two parties’ platform choices. In
Stage 2, in each constituency δ ∈ [0,1], candidates from the two parties, Aδ and Bδ,
respectively, compete in a ﬁrst-past-the-post election. In each constituency δ, knowing
the median voter’s location δ, the two candidates simultaneously choose positions in
[0,1]. A candidate may take any position she wishes in [0,1], but advocating a position
different from her party’s platform has a cost: if Party A chooses platform a in Stage 1,
theninanyconstituencyδ, candidateAδ pays|α−a|totakethepositionα, andlikewise
for Bδ. The further the candidate locates from her party’s platform, the higher the cost;
for simplicity the marginal cost is constant and normalized to one for all candidates.
In δ the candidate who locates closer to the median voter’s bliss point δ wins ofﬁce;
in particular, voters care only about their winning candidate’s position and not about
the platform of that candidate’s party. In case of a tie both candidates win ofﬁce with
probability
1
2. In every constituency δ, both candidates know δ before choosing their
positions.6 The winner of each election receives the private beneﬁt 2V >0 and the loser
nobeneﬁt. (Aslongascostsarelinear,candidates’behaviordependsonlyontheratioof
V to the marginal cost of positioning; hence, an increase in V can be interpreted also as
a decrease in that marginal cost.) Candidates’ payoffs as a function of parties’ positions,





2V −|α−a| if |α−δ|<|β −δ|
V −|α−a| if |α−δ|=|β −δ|
−|α−a| if |α−δ|>|β −δ|
5Section 5 relaxes this assumption.
6Theformalmodelcanequallywellbeinterpretedasonewithasingleconstituency, wherepartiesshare





2V −|β −b| if |β −δ|<|α−δ|
V −|β −b| if |β −δ|=|α−δ|
−|β −b| if |β −δ|>|α−δ|.
A candidate’s (mixed) strategy maps any given combination of party platforms (a,b)
(chosen by the parties in Stage 1) into a distribution over the policy space [0,1]. Thus, a
strategy for candidate Aδ is given by FAδ : [0,1]2 7→ ∆[0,1], where for any (a,b) ∈ [0,1]2,
FAδ(a,b;·) ∈ ∆[0,1] is a (cumulative) distribution function on [0,1], and likewise for
Bδ. Note that these distributions need not be absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure; candidates’ strategies may contain mass points.
Each party’s payoff is the average of its candidates’ payoffs across all constituencies,
i.e., the payoff of party i ∈{A,B} as a function of the platforms (a,b) and the candidates’










We analyze subgame-perfect equilibria in which parties play pure strategies (while can-
didates may play mixed strategies).7 We adopt the convention that a ≤b.
DEFINITION 1. The strategy proﬁle (a∗,b∗,(F∗
Aδ)δ∈[0,1],(F∗
Bδ)δ∈[0,1]) is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the election game if
1. for each δ ∈[0,1] and each pair of platforms (a,b), for each α in the support of the
























In the next section we completely characterize the candidates’ equilibrium strate-
gies. Section 4 solves for the parties’ subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies by back-
ward induction.
7The existence of such equilibria follows from Theorem 1 below. Furthermore, Proposition 1 shows that
there do not exist equilibria in which the candidates’ strategies are pure.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Party platforms in electoral competition 49
3. ELECTORAL COMPETITION
Thissectionanalyzeselectoralcompetitionbetweencandidates,takingtheparties’plat-
forms as given. As before denote the platforms of Parties A and B by a and b, respec-
tively. When |δ −a| < |δ −b| (|δ −a| > |δ −b|), Party A is closer to (further from) the
median voter, and we refer to Candidate Aδ as being advantaged (disadvantaged). In
most of this section we assume that Bδ is not disadvantaged and further that a ≤b ≤δ:
the median voter’s bliss point lies to the right of both parties. That is, for every δ ∈ [0,1]
we determine F∗
Aδ(a,b;·) and F∗
Bδ(a,b;·) only for a ≤ b ≤ δ.8 Because the winner of the
election depends only upon the distances between the two candidates and the voter’s
bliss point and not upon the distance between the candidates, this also determines F∗
Aδ
and F∗
Bδ for the case where the median voter’s bliss point lies to the left of one party.
Equilibria in the other cases can be easily derived from symmetry properties, and a can-
didate’s payoff given general party platforms can be deduced from the case a ≤ b ≤ δ
by a transformation of the platforms.9 We focus on this one case solely to shorten the
exposition.
When both parties’ platforms are close enough to the median voter’s bliss point in
constituency δ, then in any equilibrium of the second stage both candidates locate at
this bliss point. When δ <V +a, the unique equilibrium is for both candidates to locate
at δ. If δ > V +a, then Aδ is unwilling to locate at the median voter’s bliss point to win
the election with probability one-half; in equilibrium, both candidates cannot choose
the median voter’s bliss point with probability one. In this case, unless each candidate
chooses to locate at her party’s platform, the equilibrium must be in mixed strategies.
Otherwise, some candidate would pay costs higher than necessary to win with proba-
bility zero or one, or each candidate would win with probability one-half yet could win
for sure by moving inﬁnitesimally closer to the median voter.
We develop F∗
Aδ(a,b;·) and F∗
Bδ(a,b;·) through a series of lemmata. To state the ﬁrst
lemma, we say that a distribution function F has a gap between x and y > x if F(x) =
supt<y F(t). All proofs are in the Appendix.
LEMMA 1. Let a ≤ b ≤ δ. For each pair of candidates’ strategies ((F∗
Aδ)δ∈[0,1],(F∗
Bδ)δ∈[0,1])
we have the following two properties.
(i) If F∗
Aδ(a,b;·) (F∗
Bδ(a,b;·)) has a gap between x ≥ b and y < δ then it has a gap
between x and δ and F∗
Bδ(a,b;·) (F∗
Aδ(a,b;·)) also has a gap between x and δ.
(ii) F∗
Aδ(a,b;·) (F∗
Bδ(a,b;·)) can have an atom only at A’s (B’s) party platform or at δ. If
8One can interpret a Stage-2 subgame as a complete-information, common-value, all-pay auction with
a bid cap (the median voter’s position) and handicap (Candidate Aδ’s disadvantage). We know of no paper




δ ≤b. Because Aδ is disadvantaged and located to the left of δ, her equilibrium strategy is exactly the same
as in the case where a ≤e b ≤ δ for e b = 2δ−b (note that |δ−e b| = |δ−b|). Candidate Bδ is advantaged and
putsthesamemassonb andδ asshewouldputonδ ande b =2δ−b. Shemixesonsome(r,b)(withdensity
1/2V) if and only if she would mix on (e b,2δ−r) if her position weree b.50 Eyster and Kittsteiner Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
F∗
Aδ(a,b;·) (F∗
Bδ(a,b;·)) has an atom at δ, then F∗
Bδ(a,b;·) (F∗
Aδ(a,b;·)) has an atom
at δ.
This result implies that the candidates’ equilibrium strategies F∗
Aδ(a,b;·) and
F∗
Bδ(a,b;·) have common support except at the parties’ platforms.
LEMMA 2. Let a ≤ b ≤ δ. In any constituency δ with δ > a +V, in equilibrium at least
one candidate puts mass on her party’s platform. Consequently, at least one candidate
gets an equilibrium payoff of zero.
Since F∗
Aδ(a,b;·) and F∗
Aδ(a,b;·) must have common support except at a or b, if nei-
ther candidate adopts her party’s position, then equilibrium strategies must have com-
mon support. But this cannot be unless both adopt the median voter’s bliss point with
probability one; otherwise, given the equilibrium strategies have no atoms except at the
median voter’s bliss point, the disadvantaged candidate sometimes pays a positive cost
tolosewithprobabilityone. Infact,CandidateAδ mustalwaysputmassona,otherwise
Bδ would be unwilling to put mass on b, and we have a contradiction. Now note that if
Candidate Aδ randomizes over some interval (u,v), with b ≤ u < v ≤ δ, then she must
be indifferent between locating at t ∈(u,v) and t +" ∈(u,v), meaning that
F∗
Bδ(a,b;t)2V −(t −a)= F∗










Letting " → 0 (and repeating the argument for t −") gives a formula for the probability
density function, f ∗
Bδ(a,b;t) = 1/2V for any t ∈ (u,v). Since the same argument holds
for Bδ, both candidates randomize (over intervals) with the same density function.
We now know the structure of the candidates’ equilibrium strategies. If δ > a +V
one or both candidates put mass on their party’s position. Candidates then may ran-
domize over (b,r), for some r, with density 1/2V. Finally candidates may put mass on
the median voter’s bliss point. If candidates put no mass on the median voter’s bliss
point, then r = a +2V, the furthest away from a that Aδ is willing to locate to win the
election with probability one. If candidates put mass on the median voter’s bliss point,
then r <a +2V. Finding F∗
Aδ(a,b;·) and F∗
Bδ(a,b;·) consists merely of checking which of
these strategy proﬁles is a mutual best response for each conﬁguration of (a,b,δ).
PROPOSITION 1. Let a ≤ b ≤ δ. The candidates’ equilibrium strategies (F∗
Aδ,F∗
Bδ), which
are unique for δ 6=a +V, are characterized as follows.




0 if t <a




0 if t <b
1 if t ≥b
i.e. each candidate locates at her party’s platform.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Party platforms in electoral competition 51
Suppose b −a <2V.






0 if t <a
b−a















i.e. each candidate randomizes over (b,a +2V) with density 1/2V and puts mass
on her party’s platform.
(M2) If
1






0 if t <a
b−a







if δ >t >b














if δ >t ≥b
1 if t ≥δ
i.e. each candidates randomizes over (b,2δ−a −2V) with density 1/2V and puts
mass on her party’s platform and δ.








0 if t <a
V−δ+b
V if δ >t ≥a






0 if t <b
δ−V−a
V if δ >t ≥b
1 if t ≥δ
i.e. each candidate randomizes between her party’s platform and δ.






0 if t <a
q if δ >t ≥a




0 if t <δ
1 if t ≥δ
forsomeq ≤(V −δ+b)/V;i.e., Bδ locatesat δ,and Aδ locatesat a withprobability
q and at δ with probability 1−q.





0 if t <δ
1 if t ≥δ


















FIGURE 1. The form of the candidates’ strategies across constituencies.
Figure 1 illustrates the form that candidates’ equilibrium strategies take in constit-
uency δ as a function of a and b, where a ≤ b; the case where a ≤ b ≤ δ covered in
Proposition 1 corresponds to the triangle with vertices {(0,0),(0,δ),(δ,δ)}. When the
distance between A and B is large (b ≥ a + 2V) both candidates choose their party’s
platform (P1). For the remaining cases, assume that this condition does not hold. If
the distance between A and the median voter’s bliss point is large (
1
2(a +b)+V ≤ δ),
then both candidates mix over positions to the right of b: Aδ tries to steal Bδ’s election
without locating at δ, forcing Bδ to take a position between her party’s platform and the
median voter’s bliss point to fend off Aδ (M1 and M2).10 When the distance between A
and the median voter’s bliss point is small, then Aδ ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to directly
adopt the median voter’s position than to attempt to outmaneuver Bδ; in this case, each
candidate locates at her party’s position with positive probability and locates at δ with
the complementary probability (M3). Finally, when A is close enough to the median
voter’s bliss point (a +V > δ), then both candidates adopt the median voter’s position
δ (P2). The remainder of Figure 1 shows how these different forms of equilibria apply
when a ≤ δ ≤ b (and cases where b ≤ a can be found by mirroring the regions about
the 45-degree line). An essential feature of candidates’ equilibrium strategies is that
they mix over positions: in many constituencies, neither candidate knows her rival’s
10Candidates in this case put mass on the median voter (M2 but not M1) when A is sufﬁciently close to
δ, namely a +2V >δ.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Party platforms in electoral competition 53
B
A









FIGURE 2. The candidates’ expected positions across constituencies for V =
1






equilibrium position when selecting her own position. However, mixing per se does not
drive our party differentiation result, as discussed in Section 6.
Figure 2 depicts a different facet of the candidates’ equilibrium strategies by show-
ing each candidate’s expected position in each constituency, using a bold dashed line











14).11 For δ / ∈ (a,b), each candidate chooses to locate at
her party platform (P1). In centrist constituencies, each candidate puts mass on her
party platform and the median voter—the lighter 45-degree, a, andb lines in this region
depict the support of the candidates’ mixed strategies—adopting the median voter’s po-
sition with probability one for δ =
1
2 (M3).
Figure 3 shows the candidates’ expected positions in each constituency, again using
a bold dashed line for B and a bold solid one for A, when V =
1





When δ <b −V, Bδ is unwilling to move to δ to win with probability one-half. In these
constituencies, each candidate sometimes adopts her party’s platform and otherwise
mixes over policies to the left of a, putting mass on the median voter in more centrist
constituencies (M1 and M2). In constituencies δ ∈(b −V,a +V), both candidates adopt
themedianvoter’spositions(P2). Asδ movesabovea+V, Aδ’sexpectedpositionjumps
11In Figures 2 and 3, we choose party platforms that turn out to be equilibrium platforms for the chosen

















FIGURE 3. The candidates’ expected positions across constituencies for V =
1






down as she adopts position δ with probability signiﬁcantly less than one, a discontinu-
itydiscussedbelow(M3). Forconstituenciesfurthertotheright, Aδ mixesbetweena, δ,
and positions to the right of b (M1 and M2, where the shaded region depicts positions
to the right of b in the support of the candidates’ mixed strategies).
Together, the ﬁgures illustrate some central predictions of our model. Constituen-
cies at the center of the political spectrum are heavily contested as candidates take sim-
ilar positions close to that of the median voter. More extremist constituencies are less
heavily contested as candidates adopt positions closer to their party platforms, even
when that means that one candidate seldom wins. As a result, candidates in more right-
ist constituencies do not always take more rightist positions on average than those in
more leftist constituencies.
Characterizing the parties’ equilibrium platform choices requires only the candi-
dates’ equilibrium payoffs; as shown in Proposition 1 these are unique for a ≤ b ≤ δ
as long as δ 6= a +V, i.e. for given (a,b) they are unique for almost all constituencies δ.
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COROLLARY 1. Assume a ≤ b ≤ δ. The disadvantaged Candidate Aδ’s equilibrium ex-
pected payoff in any subgame is
UAδ(a,b,δ)=
(
V −δ+a if δ−a <V
0 otherwise.





min{2V,b −a} if V ≤δ−
1
2(a +b)
2(V −δ+b) if δ−
1
2(a +b)<V <δ−a
V −δ+b if δ−a <V
t ∈[V −δ+b,2(V −δ+b)] if δ−a =V.
Whenδ−a <V,bothcandidateslocateatthemedianvoter’sposition,inwhichcase
each gets one-half the value of winning the election minus the costs of location. When
δ−a >V, the disadvantaged candidate’s expected payoff is zero because she selects her
party’s platform with positive probability, and receives a payoff of zero when she does
so.
The advantaged candidate’s payoff depends upon her distance to the disadvantaged
candidate as well as each candidate’s distance to the median voter. To organize con-
stituencies, we divide them into two classes depending upon the location of their me-
dian voter’s bliss point relative to the party platforms.
DEFINITION 2. If parties A and B locate at a and b, respectively, then constituency δ is




2(a +b)+V] or |b −a|>2V. A constituency is central if it is
not extremal.
In particular, when a ≤ b ≤ δ, the constituency δ is extremal if δ > V +
1
2(a +b).
Whenb −a >2V, a <b ≤δ implies that δ >V +
1
2(a +b); in this case, all constituencies
δ ≥b >a are extremal. A constituency is extremal if its median voter lies sufﬁciently far
from the party platforms. A constituency where each candidate chooses its party’s plat-
form is extremal. The only other extremal constituencies are those where Aδ mixes to
the right of Bδ. Corollary 1 states that in extremal constituencies the advantaged candi-
date’s expected payoff does not depend upon the distance between her party’s platform
and the median voter: either she wins for sure without departing from her party’s posi-
tion and gets 2V, or Aδ competes with her, and Bδ’s expected payoff equals the distance
between the parties’ platforms.
In central constituencies, Bδ’s payoff increases the closer her party’s platform is to
the median voter. However, the rate at which her payoff changes as a function of the
distance between her party’s platform and the median voter is not constant. When
δ − a = V, Bδ locates at the median voter’s bliss point for sure, and Aδ, who is indif-
ferent between locating at the median voter’s bliss point and choosing his party’s plat-
form, locates at the median voter’s bliss point with sufﬁciently high probability.12 As
12The probability that Aδ stays at his party’s platform affects Bδ’s equilibrium payoff, which explains why56 Eyster and Kittsteiner Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
δ − a increases—holding everything else constant—Aδ prefers to remain at his party
platform. To keep Aδ indifferent over choosing the median voter’s bliss point and her
party platform, Bδ cannot locate at the median voter’s bliss point with probability one.
To make Bδ indifferent over the median voter’s bliss point and her party’s platform, Aδ
must adhere to his party platform with sufﬁciently high probability. Thus, the probabil-
itythatAδ choosesthemedianvoter’sblisspointjumpsdownasδ−a movesthroughV,
and so Bδ’s expected payoff jumps up. For δ−a < V—competition is tough—Bδ bene-









Aδ(a∗,b∗,a∗) < 1 or F∗
Bδ(a∗,b∗,b∗) < 1. A constituency is uncontested in
the equilibrium (a∗,b∗,(F∗
Aδ)δ∈[0,1],(F∗
Bδ)δ∈[0,1]) if it is not contested in that equilibrium.
A constituency is uncontested if both candidates adhere to their parties’ platforms
withprobabilityone. Whileourterminologydiffersfromthemorestandardnotionofan
uncontested constituency as one where one of the two parties fails to ﬁeld a candidate,
there is little substantive difference: in an uncontested constituency as we deﬁne it, the
disadvantaged candidate locates at her party’s platform and loses with probability one;
neither the winner’s location nor anyone’s payoff would change if the party did not ﬁeld
the candidate at all. If Candidate Aδ must incur costs larger than the value of winning
the election to locate at Party B’s platform (b −a ≥2V), then in equilibrium each candi-
date locates at her party’s platform; such constituencies are uncontested. On the other
hand, if Aδ can choose Party B’s platform at a cost less than the value of winning the
election (b −a <2V), then the constituency δ is contested.
4. PLATFORM LOCATION
This section analyzes the parties’ platform choices. Parties maximize their candidates’
payoffs taking into account how their platform choices affect subsequent campaigning.
When the private beneﬁt of winning election, 2V, is not too large, parties adopt dis-
tinct platforms, one to the right of
1
2 and the other to the left. In central constituencies,
the advantaged candidate’s payoff decreases in her distance from the median voter; this
gives parties an incentive to minimize the expected distance between their platform
and the median voter. In extremal constituencies, the advantaged candidate’s payoff
increases the further her party’s platform lies from the opponent’s; this provides par-
ties with an incentive to differentiate from each other. However, the fact that in not
all central constituencies are the candidates’ payoffs affected by platforms in the same
way—candidates have more incentive to be near the median voter when equilibria are
Proposition 2 excludes the case δ − a = V. For any a and b, the event that δ − a = V occurs with zero





















FIGURE 4. Party Platforms in Equilibrium. For V ≤
1
6, any pair (a,b) of positions whereb is in the
shaded region and a = 2V −b is an equilibrium. For V =
1




4 is an equilibrium.
in mixed strategies—creates another motive for party differentiation. When choosing
platforms, parties trade off these effects.
Theorem 1 completely characterizes parties’ (pure) equilibrium strategies, denoted
by a∗ and b∗.13 Figure 4 illustrates the parties’ equilibrium strategies.









2) if V >
1
2






























2, parties do not differentiate and locate at one-half. For high V winning the
election with probability one-half is sufﬁciently valuable that candidates always adopt
13Sincetheﬁrststageissymmetricwithexpectedpayoffsthatarecontinuousinpartyplatform, thegame
has a symmetric equilibrium in which parties play mixed strategies. Naturally this equilibrium also gener-
ates candidate differentiation.58 Eyster and Kittsteiner Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
the median voter’s position; as a result, neither party can soften competition by separat-
ing from the other.
If V <
1
6, parties maintain an equilibrium distance of 2V, the private value of win-
ning the election. The shaded region in Figure 4 shows the multiplicity of such equi-
libria. In equilibrium, constituencies with a median voter’s bliss point between the two
party platforms are contested, while all others are not. Parties have no incentive to take
more extreme positions, which would not affect their payoffs from extremal constituen-
cies (2V) but would lower their payoffs from central constituencies. Nor do they have
incentive to go to the center. The loss from moving " closer to the center is proportional
to " for extremal constituencies and the gain proportional to " for central constituen-
cies; when V is small and parties separate by no more than 2V, there are many more
extremal constituencies, so that the ﬁrst effect dominates.
As V increases, each party wishes to move away from the center to maintain a dis-
tance of 2V from the other in order to secure its “home turf”; by locating too close to
each other, parties would eliminate uncontested constituencies where their payoffs are
highest. On the other hand, as V increases, this set of extremal constituencies shrinks.
Consequently, the parties’ incentive to move to the center to decrease their costs of win-
ning contested, central constituencies grows larger by comparison. For V <
1
6, the ﬁrst
effect dominates, and parties keep a distance of 2V: parties differentiate as V increases.
For V >
1
6, parties separate by less than 2V, so that all constituencies are contested.
When the private beneﬁt 2V of winning is low (or, alternatively, when campaign
costs are high), the two parties maintain enough distance between themselves that the
only contested constituencies are those with median voters lying between the parties.
In other words, parties are always (weakly) more extreme than their members. When
the private beneﬁt of winning is high (or campaign costs are low), all constituencies are
contested: parties separate by less than 2V. Nevertheless, as V increases, electoral com-
petition increases, which shifts the set of constituencies that a given party wins with
probability greater than one-half away from one-half. Since it is in these constituencies
that parties have the most incentive to locate close to the median voter, they move away
from one-half as V increases.
5. GENERAL DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS
Until now, we have assumed the distribution of median voters across constituencies
to be uniform on [0,1]. In this section we explore the robustness of our results to less
heterogeneity among constituencies.
To do this, we restrict attention to distributions of median voters that are single-
peaked, symmetric, and non-atomic in the sense that their cdf and pdf, G and g, re-
spectively, satisfy the following two conditions: G(x) = 1 −G(1 − x), and g is strictly
increasing on [0,
1
2]. Proposition 2 shows the robustness of our main result that parties
offer differentiated platforms.
PROPOSITION 2. For any single-peaked and symmetric distribution, there exists a thresh-




















FIGURE 5. Distributions of constituencies.
Proposition 2 establishes that equilibria where parties differentiate by 2V are robust
to small deviations from uniformity in the distribution of median voters across con-
stituencies.




2] and median voters are uniformly distributed, we saw that parties
differentiatebylessthan2V. Thiscanoccuralsounderotherdistributionfunctions, but
a precise characterization of the equilibria of this kind would be cumbersome, mainly
because the equilibria depend on local properties of G and lack closed-form expres-
sions. Nevertheless, it is interesting to analyze how a change in the polarization of me-
dian voters affects the parties’ positions. We illustrate some comparative statics using a
parametrized family of triangular distributions about one-half.




1−h +4hx if x ≤
1
2
1+3h −4hx if x >
1
2
for h ∈ (0,1]. As h decreases, the electorate (median voters’ bliss points) becomes more




2,1}. We are interested in how party platforms
change with h. It can be shown that (at least) for “small” values of h there exists an equi-
librium (a∗,b∗) with the property that 2V ≥ b∗ −a∗ ≥ V. This follows from the fact that
the candidates’ strategies do not depend on the distribution of median voters and that
the proof of Theorem 1 extends in a continuous way: for “small” h the distribution of





ties’ equilibrium platforms are unique and have the property that all constituencies are
contested (parties separate by less than 2V). As shown in the proof of Theorem 1, Party
A’s best-response correspondence is single-peaked for h = 0 and thus also for “small”60 Eyster and Kittsteiner Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
h. Consequently, the platform a is a best response to the platform b >
1
2 if and only if
∂U
h
A(a,b)/∂ a = 0, namely Party A’s payoff U
h











Using the symmetry of gh, which implies that the equilibrium positions are symmet-
ric as well, we can solve the quadratic equation ∂U
h












h2 +h +1+4h2V 2 −2h2V −2hV. (1)
Hence (a∗,b∗), with b∗ = 1−a∗, describes the parties’ equilibrium strategies. As a∗ in-
creases in h, an immediate consequence of (1) is that the distance between the parties’
platforms decreases in h. When constituencies are more homogeneous, parties choose
more central platforms. The intuition is straightforward: as the number of central con-
stituencies increases in h, parties care more about centrality and thus choose more cen-
tral positions.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a rationale for differentiation between ex ante identical political
parties in a Hotelling–Downs-style model of electoral competition. In our model, par-
ties are benevolent to their many purely opportunistic candidates running in heteroge-
neous constituencies with different voter preferences. Parties choose policy platforms
that serve as default positions for their candidates. Candidates may deviate from their
parties’ platforms at a cost: the more they deviate, the higher these “campaign costs.” In
equilibrium, parties do not locate at the center of the political spectrum, which would
maximize the number of elections that their candidates win. Instead, they locate their
platforms less centrally; by separating, they avoid costly campaigns. In this way, each
party carves out a “home turf” of constituencies that can be won with little or no cam-
paigning. Decreasing campaign costs causes parties to move further apart: because
candidates campaign more vigorously, each party moves away from the other to carve
out its home turf. More heterogeneity across constituencies also increases party differ-
entiation for the straightforward reason that there are more extremist constituencies to
be won.
Ourintentioninthispaperhasbeentore-exploretheeffectsofpoliticalcompetition
on electoral positioning. Many commentators have observed that political candidates
seldom espouse common policies. This paper provides an explanation for this ﬁnding
through political parties: candidates differ because their parties differ; parties differ to
reduce political competition. Other authors have offered other compelling reasons for
political differentiation, and we do not suggest that party competition constitutes the
14This is the equivalent of subcase (iii) in the proof of Theorem 1.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Party platforms in electoral competition 61
sole impetus for differentiation. However, we think it is an important exercise to under-
stand how competition between parties affects their candidates’ positioning.15
A crucial assumption underlying party differentiation in our model is that candi-
dates incur costs by deviating from their party platforms. In our model, candidates
pay these campaign costs regardless of whether they win election. Yet some reasons
why candidates may ﬁnd deviating from party policy costly may loom larger when they
win than when they lose. If campaign costs were paid only by winning candidates, our
qualitative results would be unaffected. The closer the parties’ platforms, the more in-
tense would be electoral competition (the higher candidates’ campaign costs in equilib-
rium). One difference from our model is that the disadvantaged candidate could move
2V from her platform before incurring a negative payoff. When V >
1
4, both parties in
equilibrium choose platforms at
1
2, and in every constituency both candidates adopt
the median voter’s position with certainty. When V ≤
1





2 +V, and constituencies with extreme median voters go uncon-
tested. Here too the degree to which candidates differentiate increases in V (or, equiva-
lently, decreases in campaign costs). The fact that in this model candidates’ equilibrium
strategies are pure underscores the fact that differentiation in our model is not an ar-
tifact of the candidates’ playing mixed strategies. The absence of mixing in this model
also allows it the following, alternative interpretation: candidates have policy prefer-
ences; parties have none; and the winning party must pay a cost to attract a candidate
whose preferred policy differs from its platform.
The assumption that both parties value winning a constituency by 2V can be re-
laxed. In a more general model in which the valuations of parties A and B are 2VA and
2VB respectively, party differentiation can also occur in equilibrium. If, for example,
1




5} (in particular, valuations are not too asym-















For different valuations, the “stronger” Party A locates more centrally than the weaker
B. AsVA increases, bothpartiesmovetotheright(B fasterthanA), andtheweakerparty
B is pushed to her end of the policy spectrum. When B becomes less competitive, the
beneﬁts from avoiding competition become larger and B moves to the right; A exploits




4(VA +VB) so that, as
in our symmetric baseline model, as valuations increase parties move apart.
In our model, the distribution of median voters across constituencies is uniform.
However, the way party differentiation depends upon V holds for any continuous,
single-peaked distribution of the median voter’s location. As V increases from zero, the
15An open empirical question is how the presence or absence of parties in different elections affects
candidate differentiation.
16The cumbersome derivation of this result is available in a supplementary ﬁle on the journal website,
http://econtheory.org/supp/176/supplement.pdf.62 Eyster and Kittsteiner Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
parties’ equilibrium platforms separate more and more until V reaches a critical size, at
which point parties locate at one-half. Hence, the intuition that underlies equilibrium
when V ≤
1
6 does not rely on uniformity. For V sufﬁciently small, parties separate their
platformsby2V.17 Movingfurtherapartonlydiminishespayoffsforcentralmedianvot-
ers, whereas moving further together costs more in the many extremal constituencies




ments depends upon a comparison of the measure of constituencies where candidates
always adopt the median voter’s preferred position to those where candidates mix be-
tween that and their parties’ platforms.
Parties in our model choose their platforms to maximize their candidates’ average
payoffs. If instead each party chooses its party platform via a majoritarian election
among its candidates, the result would be very different. Each candidate wishes her
partywouldlocateitsplatformatherconstituency’smedianvoterregardlessoftheother
party’s location. It is easy to verify that candidates’ preferences over their party’s loca-
tionsatisfyGansandSmart’s1996single-crossingcondition, implyingthattheirmedian
bliss point—the median among median voters—is a Condorcet winner. This equilib-
riumdifferssodramaticallyfromoursbecauseamajoritarian partydoesnottradegains
in one constituency off against losses in another. Yet parties should facilitate mutually
advantageous trades, for instance by having more extremist candidates pay centrists’
campaign costs in return for moving party platform away from the center.
While we have interpreted our formal model in terms of parties and candidates, the
results carry over to a single election without parties. Consider two candidates cam-
paigning for election, where over the course of the campaign they learn information
about voters’ preferences. One formulation of this strategic setting coincides with our
two-stage model: ﬁrst candidates take initial policy positions with prior beliefs that the
median voter’s position is uniformly distributed on [0,1]; then they learn the median
voter’s preferences; and ﬁnally they take new positions, where departing from their ini-
tial positions is costly. Notice that someone who maximizes total payoff while facing
a distribution of median voters across constituencies that is uniform on [0,1] acts in
the same way as someone who maximizes expected payoff while facing a single con-
stituency whose median voter’s position is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution
on[0,1]. Inequilibrium,candidatesattheoutsetofthecampaignsplitthepoliticalspec-
trum, each one essentially betting on a median voter near her position that allows her
to win the election at minimal cost. As the campaign progresses, either one candidate
“concedes”—makes no movement to the median voter knowing that she will lose—or
both move closer to the median voter.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. 1. Suppose Candidate iδ’s strategy has a gap between x and y
but not between x and δ. Let z = sup{w | Fiδ(w) = Fiδ(x)} be the point where
17The maximum value of V for which parties maintain a distance of 2V does depend on the distribu-
tion and can be no larger than
1
6, for the uniform distribution has more variance than any single-peaked
distribution.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Party platforms in electoral competition 63
the gap ends, so x < z < δ. Because locating in a gap of the other candidate’s
strategy can never be optimal—decreasing the position a small amount decreases
costswithoutchangingthewinningprobability—bothcandidates’strategiesmust
have gaps between x and z. But since both cannot have atoms at z 6= δ (for then
either candidate could discretely increase her winning probability with neglible
increase in cost), at least one candidate can beneﬁt by locating in (x,z) (which
decreases costs without affecting the winning probability).
2. Clearly,nocandidatelocatesin(a,b). Ifiδ’sstrategyhasanatomatx ∈[b,δ),then
for some " > 0 jδ 6= iδ does not locate in (x −",x), because moving slightly above
x increases payoffs. But with a gap between x −" and x, iδ could beneﬁt by going
into (x −",x) unless x =b1 and iδ = Bδ. Suppose only Aδ has an atom at δ. Then
Bδ must have a gap between some x < δ and δ—going to δ −" for some " > 0
cannot be as good for Bδ as going to δ—in which case Aδ can beneﬁt by moving
mass from δ into (x,δ). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. If not, then we know from the proof of Proposition 1 that inf{x :
FAδ(x)>0}=inf{x : FAδ(x)>0}=δ, a contradiction. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. When δ − a < V, each candidate optimally locates at the
median voter δ given that the other does the same. First note that because each can-
didate receives a strictly positive payoff by choosing δ regardless of the other’s strat-
egy, each has a strictly positive expected payoff in equilibrium. We claim that inf{t :
F∗
Aδ(a,b;t) > 0} = inf{t : F∗
Bδ(a,b;t) > 0} = δ. If the inﬁma are unequal, the candidate
with the lower inﬁmum, i, does not get a positive expected payoff for all positions in the
support of F∗
iδ(a,b;·). For each candidate to get a strictly positive payoff at this common
inﬁmum, each must put mass on the inﬁmum. But this can happen only at δ, for other-
wise each could discretely increase her winning probability by increasing her costs only
inﬁnitesimally.
When δ − a ≥ V, then the result follows from the considerations before the
proposition. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 1. AssumePartyA takestheplatforma andParty B takestheplat-
form b.
CLAIM 1. If y >
1
2, a position x > y yields strictly lower payoff for the party at x than the
mirroredposition2y −x. If y <
1
2,apositionx <y yieldsstrictlylowerpayofffortheparty
at x than the position 2y −x. In particular there is no equilibrium where a 6=b and both
parties are strictly above
1
2 or both are strictly below
1
2.
PROOF OF CLAIM 1. By symmetry, the total payoff from constituencies with median
voters in [2y −1,1] is the same whether the party facing another party at y locates at
x > y or at 2y −x. The ﬁrst part of the claim follows from the fact that the total payoffs
from constituencies with median voters in [0,2y −1) are strictly higher at the latter po-
sition. The second part of the claim is proven similarly. 64 Eyster and Kittsteiner Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Together with symmetry, Claim 1 implies that it sufﬁces to establish the best-
response correspondence for A, as B’s can be obtained by mirroring the parties’ posi-
tions. Candidates’ payoffs in any constituency δ as a function of the party platforms
(a,b) can be derived from Proposition 1 by relabeling variables: Aδ’s payoffUAδ(a,b) is





(2δ−b,2δ−a) if δ <a






(a,b) if b <δ.
CLAIM 2. Party A never chooses a such that b −a >2V.
PROOF OF CLAIM 2. When b −a > 2V, candidates in constituencies with medians be-
low
1
2(a +b)−V (or above
1
2(a +b)+V) always choose their parties’ platforms. In no
constituencies do the candidate either both adopt the median voter’s location or both











and ∂UA(a,b)/∂ a =V >0. This proves Claim 2. 
When 0 ≤ b − a ≤ 2V, equilibrium can take any of the mixed forms described in
























and 2 imply that we can restrict attention to platforms a with 0≤b −a ≤2V. In order to
ﬁnd the maxima ofUA(a,b), we calculate its derivative for the following cases: (i)b ≤V,
(ii) b > a +V and
1
2(a +b) < V, (iii) V <b < a +V and
1
2(a +b) < V, (iv) b > a +V and
1
2(a +b)>V, and (v) b <a +V and
1
2(a +b)>V.
18Note here that x and y may not lie in [0,1]. However, since none of the results in Section 3 depend on
this assumption, we can continue to use them here.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Party platforms in electoral competition 65






































and ∂UA(a,b)/∂ a =2V −b −a >0 if a +V <1 and ∂UA(a,b)/∂ a =V −2a −b +1






















2a − V. From this, we conclude that UA(a,b) has a
uniquemaximizerina on(2V−b,b−V),since∂UA(a,b)/∂ a|a=2V−b =4b−6V >0
and ∂UA(a,b)/∂ a|a=b−V =
3




















If a + V < 1, ∂UA(a,b)/∂ a = V −
1
2(a +b) < 0. If a + V > 1, ∂UA(a,b)/∂ a =
1−a −
1
2(a +b)<0.66 Eyster and Kittsteiner Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
We can now ﬁnd the optimal a ∈(b −2V,b) by distinguishing four cases:
1. Whenb ≤V we must have V ≥
1
2, where Case i demonstrates that a =
1
2 is the best
reply to b.
2. When 0 < b − V ≤ 2V −b and b > 3V − 1, UA(a,b) has a unique maximizer at
a =2V −b. To see this note that Cases ii and v show thatUA is (strictly) increasing
in a when a < b −V and (strictly) decreasing when a > 2V −b. Because 1−V >
2V −b, UA is (strictly) increasing for a < 2V −b (Case iii) and therefore has a
unique maximizer at a =2V −b.
3. When 0 < b − V ≤ 2V −b and b ≤ 3V − 1, UA(a,b) has a unique maximizer at
a =
1
2(V −b + 1). To see this note that Cases ii and v show that UA is (strictly)
increasing for a < b −V and (strictly) decreasing for a > 2V −b. As UA is strictly
increasing for a < 1−V and as b ≤ 3V −1 we have
1
2(V −b +1) ≥ 1−V which
shows thatUA is (strictly) increasing for 1−V ≤a ≤
1
2(V −b +1). Furthermore,UA
is (strictly) decreasing for a >
1
2(V −b +1)≥1−V (see Case iii).






Without loss of generality, we can assume that b ≥
1
2 (otherwise we can transform
the entire policy space by x 7→ 1−x and relabel parties). Claims 1 and 2 imply that the
best response for Party A to b is either a = 2V −b or is deﬁned by Cases 1–4 above.
Furthermore, Claim 1 implies that in equilibrium we must have b =
1
2 or a =b or a ≤
1
2.
We ﬁrst characterize all equilibria in which b −a < 2V. If b ≤ V, then Case 1 applies:
V ≥
1
2, and a =
1
2 is a best response to b. By symmetry, checking whether b is a best
responsefor B toa =
1
2 isequivalenttocheckingwhether e a =1−b ≤
1
2 isabestresponse
for A tob =
1




2. In particular, these
arguments demonstrate that the only equilibria with
1
2 ≤b ≤V have a =b =
1
2, which is
an equilibrium for V ≥
1
2. Assume henceforth that b >V.
Whenb ≤
3




those under which e a =1−b is a best response toe b =1−a =
1
2(1−V +b). Ase b ≤V, Case
1 shows that e a is a best response toe b if and only if a =b =V =
1
2, which cannot hold (as
we assume b >V).
When b ≤
3
2V and b > 3V −1, Case 2 implies that a = 2V −b. Once again, we must
ﬁnd conditions under which e a is a best response toe b =1−2V +b. Ase b >V, Case 1 does
not apply. If 5V −2<b ≤
7
2V −1, we havee b −V ≤2V −e b ande b >3V −1 and thus Case 2









4]. If b ≤ min{
7
2V −1,5V −2}
we have e b ≤ min{
3
2V,3V −1}. Case 3 shows that we need to have e a =
1
2(V −e b +1), or
equivalently 1 −b =
1
2(V − 1 + a + 1) =
1
2(3V −b) which implies b = 2 − 3V. But thisTheoretical Economics 2 (2007) Party platforms in electoral competition 67
implies that a = 2V −b = 5V −2 such that a =b = 5V −2 = 2−3V. However, since this
requires V =
1
2, it contradicts b > V. If b >
7
2V −1, then e b >
3






5V, or equivalently b =
1
4 +V. Since we need b ≤
3
2V, it must be that V ≥
1
2.
Because we also need b >
7
2V −1, V <
1
2, which is a contradiction.
If b >
3




5V. Again we look for conditions under which e a




5V. If b ≥
5
3 −V (equivalently e b ≤ V), Case 1 dictates
that e a =
1
2 = b. This is not possible as
1
2 = b >
3





3 −V. Suppose now b <
5






















4 − V = b >
3











3 V, then we need e a =
1















we require that b >
3
2V (which implies V <
4




3 V (which implies V ≥
5
8)
































We have characterized all equilibria for b −a 6= 2V. Assume now that b −a = 2V.
Claim 2 establishes that A does not wish to lower a. Due to the single-peakedness of
UA(a,b), a = b − 2V is a best response to b if and only if ∂UA(a,b)/∂ a|a=b−2V ≤ 0.
This happens only in Cases iii, iv, and v. As b − a = 2V, only Case iv applies and re-
quires b −V ≥ a,
1




5V . These conditions are equivalent
to b ≥ 4V. Similarly, b best responds to a if and only if a ≤
1
2 (because of Claim 1)
and 1 − a = 1 −b + 2V ≥ 4V, or equivalently if and only if b ≤ min{1 − 2V,
1
2 + 2V}.
Thus, we have an equilibrium with a =b −2V if and only if V ≤
1






PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Assume Party A takes platform a, and B takes platform b,
and denote the cumulative distribution function of median voters by G and its density
by g. First note that A never chooses a such that b −a > 2V. This follows from a slight
generalization of the proof of Claim 2 (see the proof of Theorem 1). As in Claim 1 in the
proof of Theorem 1, when b >
1
2 the position a > b is strictly worse than the mirrored
position 1−a, and thus the only candidates for best responses tob >
1
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−4G(a)+G(b −V)+G(a +V)≤−3G(a)+2G(a +V).
If V ≤
1




























−2G(a)−G(b −V)+G(a +V)≤−2G(a)+G(a +V).
Deﬁne V by G(
1
2 − 2V) = 0.4 (which exists by the continuity of G). By symmetry,
G(
1
2 +2V) = 0.6. Now take V < V and choose b with
1
2 < b <
1
2 +2V. Then G(a +V) <
3
2G(a) for all a with b −2V ≤ a < b −V and G(a +V) < 2G(a) for all a with b −V ≤
a < b. This establishes that for any V < V,
1
2 < b <
1
2 + 2V, and a ∈ (b − 2V,b] we
have ∂U
G
A(a,b)/∂ a < 0, and thus a = b −2V is a best response for Party A. Mirroring
positions around
1
2 and repeating the argument completes the proof. 
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